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By Michael Ahmad
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According to the 2025 Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Enterprise Reliability Risk Priorities Report, telecommunication networks are increasingly relied on for Bulk Power System (BPS) operations, supporting Real-time monitoring, remote control, emergency response, and system restoration. This growing dependence has resulted in an expanded attack surface for cybersecurity threats to Real-time communications and reliable grid operations. In response, the ERO Enterprise identified remote connectivity as a risk element in the 2026 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program (CMEP) Implementation Plan (IP).
The purpose of CIP-012-1 is to address the confidentiality and integrity of Real-time Assessment (RTA) and Real-time monitoring (RTM) data being transmitted between Control Centers. Per the Standard, Responsible Entities are required to identify the following:
CIP-012-1 establishes expectations for confidentiality and integrity, but it does not directly target availability. Accordingly, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has approved CIP-012-2, which builds on the current version by incorporating supplemental language concerning data availability and recovery. Following the effective date of July 1, 2026, Responsible Entities will be required to identify risk mitigation strategies pertaining to the availability of RTA and RTM data, as well as methods to initiate the recovery of communication links.
Applying defense-in-depth remains an important aspect of maintaining communication resilience. While Responsible Entities should consider an approach that conforms to their unique circumstances, some best practices include:
For more information and further guidance on implementing best practices related to the protection of data in transit, Texas RE encourages Responsible Entities to consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-53 Rev. 5.