




Update on Winter 2021 Event

Mark Henry **Director, Reliability Services and Registration**

Extreme Winter Conditions Across the South Central US

February 12, 2021 to February 18, 2021



Extreme demand

Widespread generation outages


Natural gas supply issues

Huge Eastern Interconnection import power flows

Firm load shed for transmission security and capacity adequacy




What Temperature Conditions Do We Plan For?



Office of State Climatologist, Texas A&M, presented to PUCT on August 12, 2021



How Do We Characterize Possible Risks?



Risk Drivers:

- ExtremeLoad
- Thermal outages
- Wind output

Source: NERC




Event Timeline: Sunday, Feb 14 – Early Monday, Feb 15

Prior Actions During Winter Storm Uri's Development 1: 20 am · Monitor weather **EMERGENCY** 12:15 am **OPERATIONS EMERGENCY** 1:07 am Cancel/delay/return outages LEVEL 3: **EMERGENCY OPERATIONS OPERATIONS Controlled Outages** Check gas pipeline restrictions LEVEL 2: LEVEL 1: Reserves Below 1.750 Reserves Below · Factor in icing to wind forecasts 2.300 30 min ERS 10 min ERS Deployed, Load Resources Deployed, Deployed Contact state and federal agencies on emissions relief Conservation Urged Add onsite and remote support staff · Communicate with regulators, government, media, and Chief **Systems Operators** 12 PM 12:12am 5:19 pm WATCH: Physical Responsive 10:54 am 2:00 pm WATCH: Freezing Reserve Less Than 3,000 MW WATCH: Insufficient News Conference: 9:58 pm **Precipitation Forces Ancillary Services** 8:30am Forecast **CANCELLED**: Projected Reserve Transmission Offers for Conservation Emergency Capacity Watch Outages Responsive Reserve 1:00 pm Operations Alert & Media 10:00 am 3:17 pm Afternoon 11:17 pm Appeal State Operations Texas Energy WATCH: Projected **NWS Issues Wind** Deployed Responsive Reserve Center Update Reliability Council Reserve Capacity Chill Warnings meeting: Focus on 11:32pm natural gas supply ADVISORY: Physical Responsive Reserve Less Than 3.000 MW 7:06 pm **New Winter Peak** Note: Some of the times are approximate 69,222 MW



System Frequency Leading to EEA3 – 01:23 to 02:06, Feb 15





Energy Emergency Alert Level 3 (EEA3) Timeline



- 1:23 a.m. EEA3 begins
- Over 35,000 MW generation unavailable
- 1,000 MW Controlled Outages escalated up to 20,000, ends day at 19,500

Tues

- Some generators restored but others became unavailable in the same time frame
- EEA3 restoration starts until halted by DC tie cuts (SPP in EEA3) at 6:46 a.m.
- Controlled Outages vary between 15,000-19,500 MW during the day

Weds

- Temperatures moderate and more generation returns and stays in service
- EEA3 orders reduced throughout day allowing reduction in controlled outages

Thur


- Controlled Outages ended, but EEA3 still observed
- Restoration of outages, difficulties due to cold load pickup and ice storm damage

Fri

- 9:00 a.m. EEA2
- 10:00 a.m. EEA1
- 10:35 a.m. Normal Operations Begin




Hour by Hour Generation Outages and Causes





Generation, Load and Load Shed



ERCOT



Demand Response, Load Shed, and Load Loss

ERCOT-procured demand response services – some included natural gas-related loads. Load Responsive Reserve Service and 10 and 30 minute Emergency Responsive Service.

Economic demand response (price sensitive)


Regulatory orders and customer conservation

Distribution voltage reduction and other programs

EEA3 firm load shed (controlled outages) ordered by ERCOT. Circuits for load shed included some natural gas-related loads not previously identified

Distribution outages and customer power failures – including water and natural gas systems

Some underfrequency load shed (UFLS) due to frequency and manually deployed as backup source for EEA3 firm load shed






Transmission Emergencies

The bulk-power system was heavily constrained with large power flows

- On February 15, 2021, Eastern Interconnection east-to-west import power flows approached 13,000 MW to help mitigate generation shortfalls and meet winter peak energy demands in MISO and SPP.
- MISO shed in total over 2,000 MW firm load at different points in time on February 15 and 16 to avoid transmission overloads.
- ERCOT experienced a number of transmission issues but with relatively minor impact.






Natural Gas Fuel Supply Issues

Root cause of natural gas fuel supply issues:


- Production declines
 - Wellheads, gathering facilities
 - Shut-ins
 - Freezing issues
 - Power outages
 - Processing facilities
 - Supply decrease (receipts) from wells, gathering facilities
 - Mechanical failure (freezing issues)
 - Mechanical failure (other issues)
 - Power outages





Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies

Extreme conditions test the resilience of the systems we have created... and reveal the strengths and vulnerabilities in the complex relationships between our critical infrastructure elements.







ERO FERC Joint Inquiry

On 2/16/2021, FERC and NERC announced a joint inquiry into Bulk-Power System operations during the extreme winter weather conditions experienced by the Midwest and Southern Central states

Team includes nearly 50 subject matter experts from FERC, NERC, and all six Regional Entities

Data requests issued to RTOs/ISOs and entities in southern parts of SPP and MISO as well as ERCOT entities and natural gas producers, processors, and pipelines

<u>Preliminary Findings and Recommendations</u> released at FERC open meeting on September 23rd

Final report anticipated late November 2021



Preliminary Recommendations

- 28 Recommendations, which include:
 - Nine key recommendations, including Reliability Standards changes
 - Five recommendations for further study
- Each have recommended timeframes for implementation
 - before Winter 2021/2022
 - before Winter 2022/2023
 - before Winter 2023/2024

Most are recommended within

these timeframes


• These recommendations are above and beyond the NERC Reliability Standards revisions to address cold weather. See 176 FERC ¶ 61,119 (August 2021)



Preliminary Recommendations - Reliability Standards

Generator Owners and/or Generator Operators:

- Identify and protect cold-weather-critical components and systems
- Identify and implement freeze protection measure for the above
- Account for impact of precipitation and cooling effect of wind when providing temperature data
- Corrective Action Plans after freeze-related outages
- Annual training on winterization plans
- Build/retrofit to operate at specific ambient temperatures and weather based on extreme temperature and weather data,
- Provide Balancing Authority (BA) with percentage of total generating unit capacity that can be relied upon during "local forecasted cold weather," including reliability risks related to natural gas fuel contracts






Key Preliminary Recommendations - Reliability Standards

Balancing Authorities (BA)


- Use data provided by the GO/GOP, combined with its experience-based evaluation, to calculate the percentage of each individual generating unit's total capacity that it can rely upon during forecasted cold weather for its operating plans (season-ahead, day(s)-ahead) and real-time monitoring, and share with the RC
- BAs operating plans for contingency reserves and to mitigate capacity and energy emergencies to prohibit use of critical natural gas infrastructure loads for demand response
- BAs and Transmission Operators' (TOPs) manual load shed provisions to include processes for identifying and protecting critical natural gas infrastructure loads from firm load shed





Preliminary Recommendations - Reliability Standards

The load shed procedures of TOPs, Transmission Owners (TO) and Distribution Providers (DPs) should separate manual load shed circuits from underfrequency/undervoltage load shed (UFLS/UVLS) or circuits serving critical load. UFLS/UVLS circuits should be used only as a last resort, and if necessary, start with the final stage (lowest frequency) to minimize the overlap of manual and automatic load shed.







Reliability Guideline

Suggested approaches or behavior in a given technical area for the purpose of improving reliability. Guidelines are not enforceable, but may be adopted by a responsible entity in accordance with its own policies, practices, and conditions.



NERC Alert: Level 2-3


NERC alerts are divided into three distinct levels, 1) Industry Advisory, 2) Recommendation to Industry, and 3) Essential Action, which identifies actions to be taken and require the industry to respond to the ERO.



Technical Engagement

Technical Engagement is a catch-all for a variety of technical activity that is conducted between the ERO and entities. This includes, technical committee activities, technical reference documents, workshops and conferences, assist visits, joint and special studies, etc.

Electric Reliability Organization: Reliability Risk Mitigation Toolkit



Reliability Standards



NERC Reliability Standards define the mandatory reliability requirements for planning and operating the North American BPS and are developed using a results-based approach focusing on performance, risk management, and entity capabilities.

Reliability Assessment



NERC independently assesses and reports on the overall reliability, adequacy, and associated risks that could impact BPS reliability. Long-term assessments identify emerging reliability issues that support public policy input, improved planning and operations, and general public awareness.

NERC Alert: Level 1



NERC Alerts are divided into three distinct levels, 1) Industry Advisory, 2) Recommendation to Industry, and 3) Essential Action, which identifies actions to be taken and require the industry to respond to the ERO.

